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INTRODUCTION
Crisis as an opportunity for change has been 
part of historical and development literature 
and is an oft- repeated theme. The Chinese word 
for crisis (危機), for example, consists of two 
symbols often characterised in popular literature 
as denoting ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’.1 For 
India’s healthcare system, the COVID-19 crisis 
has highlighted the urgency of reform. We have 
learnt that no matter how long or how stringent 
a lockdown is, we cannot flatten the curve effec-
tively, nor fairly, without a robust health system. 
In the pre- COVID-19 world, practitioners 
and policy- makers were gathering around the 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) agenda that 
sought to expand the number of health services 
provided to the largest number of beneficiaries 
at the cheapest possible cost, constituting the 
three dimensions of UHC.2 This pandemic has 
made it clear that incremental progress along 
those three dimensions while necessary, is insuf-
ficient to move towards a health system that is 
responsive, resilient and fair.
India’s health system is highly heterogeneous 
and fragmented with multiple agencies at central 
and provincial levels governing various aspects 
of health policy- making and service delivery.3 
Public expenditure on health remains among 
the lowest making up just over 1% of gross 
domestic product (GDP). Public health gover-
nance, therefore, remains underdeveloped and 
relatively neglected among both researchers and 
practitioners. In this article, we make a case for 
an adaptive governance approach that actively 
embraces multidimensionality with respect 
to health system reforms in India, taking into 
account simultaneous technical and political 
engagement at central, state (provincial) and 
local government levels.
LOCUS OF CHANGE: CENTRAL, STATE AND LOCAL
Among the core elements of a strong health 
system ought to be an ability to leverage the 
strengths at different levels and complement 
them in responding to a crisis. Typically, higher 
levels of the system are geared towards stra-
tegic functions, while the lower levels (closer to 
people) are organised for operational functions. 
The constitution of India lists health under the 
jurisdiction of the provincial governments.4 
The provinces (states) are, thus, responsible 
for priority- setting and organisation of health 
services. However, the central government 
continues to play a substantial role in policy- 
making and resource provision as well as regu-
lating information flow and research. The 
administration of health facilities and commu-
nity engagement are usually the domain of 
Summary box
 ► The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed weaknesses 
of the Indian health system, highlighting the urgency 
of fundamental reforms.
 ► There is a need to conceptualise health system re-
forms in a multidimensional way keeping comple-
mentarity across levels of government.
 ► An adaptive governance framework that relies on 
shared accountability while reconciling varying 
levels of flexibility across three dimensions—oper-
ational processes, institutional linkages and health 
system values, is the way to build a resilient health 
system in India.
 ► We identify three reforms as illustrative examples 
of how a process of continuous consultation, co-
ordination and collaboration across central, state 
(provincial) and local levels of government, with an 
underlying adaptive governance logic ought to be 
driving these reforms.
 ► The reforms include an integrated national health 
data system, improving purchasing and regulation of 
the private sector and intersectoral delivery of health 
services.
 ► We identify the operational processes associat-
ed with each of these reforms that are delivered 
through interlocking institutional mechanisms and 
unified by a common understanding of the values 
underlying them across all levels of government.
copyright.
 on F














ealth: first published as 10.1136/bm





2 Rao NV, et al. BMJ Global Health 2021;6:e004392. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-004392
BMJ Global Health
district and subdistrict agencies. At the grassroots, frontline 
workers are called on to deliver a range of services tailored to 
local needs and capacity. The burden of adapting vertically 
flowing instructions and administrative logic into a people- 
centred service logic, thus, falls disproportionately on the 
frontline workers. Between these levels of government there 
are glaring gaps which the pandemic has exposed, placing 
the burden of delivering an essentially top- down stream of 
services, onto the lower levels.5 6 However, local governments 
at subdistrict levels lack resources and capacity to plug the 
gaps. Further, priorities at higher levels of government can 
seem disconnected to operational realities on the ground in 
the absence of active coordination and feedback.
TOWARDS CHANGE FRAMEWORKS THAT PRIORITISE 
ADAPTIVENESS
At the heart of improving our ability to face crises 
is adaptiveness; how can we improve governance at 
multiple levels of our health system, while being mindful 
of expected and unexpected impacts of such changes.7 
Adaptive governance frameworks were originally posited 
by Eleanor Ostrom and applied to the governance of 
‘common pool resources’ and since then have been 
gaining prominence in the context of social- ecological 
systems, particularly natural disasters and climate 
change.8 Adaptiveness here is an emergent property, 
arising out of the interactions between self- governing 
networks. Hill and Hupe develop this further in their 
multi- level governance framework for implementation of 
social policies.9 Literature on health systems governance 
has moved from government- led institutionalism towards 
theories emphasising principal- agent relationships.10 11 
More recent adaptive governance frameworks such as 
Abimbola et al12 apply a multilevel adaptive framework 
to analyse primary healthcare governance in low and 
middle- income countries (LMICs). Here, we posit a novel 
framework that draws from the idea of adaptiveness but 
situates it within a multilevel framework that emphasises 
the need for legitimate institutions and processes for 
feedback on strategic, tactical and operational aspects.
We envision the health system as having shared account-
ability across the levels of government along three inter-
connected dimensions (figure 1). The first and most 
visible are the operational aspects that enable the delivery 
of health services. The second dimension constitute the 
institutional linkages that exist across and within each 
level of government and determine how health is deliv-
ered. The third dimension and of the highest order are 
the values that determine the choices made at all levels 
about what constitutes good health, how it is to be deliv-
ered and by whom. This adaptive governance approach 
recognises the need for constant negotiations across the 
levels of government along these dimensions such that 
there is a high degree of flexibility at local implementa-
tion levels, bound together by a coherent set of values.
We illustrate adaptiveness through examining three 
important post- COVID-19 reform agendas for India’s 
health system from a lens of interconnectedness of 
different levels of government, the linkages and feed-
back among them. The implementation approach for 
each of the reforms requires an adaptive governance 
approach that acknowledges, facilitates and engages with 
government and other institutions at all levels and scales 
(table 1). This is neither a top- down nor a bottom- up 
approach; instead distributing constituent functions but 
unified based on a common pool of values and expected 
outcomes. The three examples we use to illustrate our 
framework are reforms of national importance in India. 
They apply not just to one setting or any one level of 
government but to all although with distributed account-
ability. Further, the three proposed reforms are them-
selves interdependent such that progress along these 
fronts can mutually reinforce (or hinder) each other.
FAVOURING FAIRNESS OVER MARKETS IN A MIXED PLURALIST 
HEALTH SYSTEM
While price regulation of commodities is typically seen 
from a macroeconomics lens, when it comes to pricing of 
medicines, vaccines and health technologies this lens is 
inappropriate, and unjust as it aggravates inequalities in 
a system where out- of- pocket expenditure on healthcare 
is already driving impoverishment among the poorest.13 
The pricing of diagnostic and treatment packages in the 
private sector in particular emerged as a major point of 
contention during the pandemic. Following news reports 
of price- gouging, India’s drug- price regulator issued an 
advisory about the prices of hand sanitisers and surgical 
masks.14 15 The Supreme Court of India also stepped in 
at various points to advise on treatment of patients in 
the private sector.16 However, the pricing and usage of 
personal protective equipment, N95 masks, face shields 
in healthcare facilities remains largely unregulated. 
Reports on the ground have demonstrated how hospitals 
used this lack of regulation to overcharge patients.17
Figure 1 Adaptive governance pyramid. An adaptive 
governance approach in a multilevel health system rests on 
linkages and feedback along three hierarchical dimensions 
of operational processes, institutional linking mechanisms 
and values underlying decision making. Adaptiveness 
requires deliberate, ongoing negotiation and consultation 
such that increasing operational flexibility is available to 
local governments while ensuring greater consensus around 
values and principles of the health system.
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The majority of India’s curative healthcare services is in 
the private sector. The public sector provides only about 
30% of all healthcare in India.18 The rest is provided by 
a mix of private for- profit hospitals, charitable hospitals, 
individual private doctors and informal care providers. 
Thus, the private healthcare providers are an indispens-
able part of India’s health service provision and need to 
be effectively and efficiently integrated.
The Clinical Establishments’ Act of 201019 was meant 
to allow the government to accurately enumerate health 
facilities, keep track of the quality and availability of 
health services across the country as well as provide a 
framework for their regulation. Several state govern-
ments have promulgated their own versions of this law 
with provisions for data sharing and price control. The 
private sector vigorously resisted the legislation both 
at the national and state levels resulting in the dilution 
of several provisions, especially with regard to price 
control.20 21 The private sector resistance combined with 
the lack of regulatory capacity among the government 
cadres has led to very poor implementation of the policy.
In addition to weaknesses as a regulator, states also lack 
the capacity to be an effective purchaser. Even as most 
states have set up some version of the national health 
insurance scheme—the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya 
Yojana (PMJAY), it is only applicable to hospitalised 
care. Less than 1% of COVID-19 patients claimed cash-
less treatment under PMJAY across the country, which 
empanels both private and public sector hospitals.22 In 
any case the majority of COVID-19 cases do not require 
hospitalisation and there are no purchasing arrange-
ments for outpatient treatment from the private sector.
While the National Health Authority that runs the 
PMJAY has made considerable strides in supporting 
purchasing decisions, it needs to reflect India’s federal 
character much more closely and be more integrated 
with preventive and primary health services. State govern-
ments need to invest more in needs and capacity assess-
ments for their own jurisdictions through inputs from 
local public health authorities, civil society partners and 
private health providers. While leveraging the technical 
inputs and negotiating power provided by national health 
authorities, states can focus on building a professional 
workforce with the technical capacity to adapt and refine 
guidelines, policies and processes to the local context.
The final arbiter of whether and how to implement a 
given programme or policy is up to officers, at district 
and subdistrict administrations, and to others further 
down the hierarchy.23 Local administrators, thus, have 
to be involved in the process of defining regulatory and 
purchasing parameters with feedback from community- 
level stakeholders. Implementing officers need to be 
empowered through institutional support while govern-
mental actions acquire legitimacy and local ownership 
through continuous community engagement.
INTEGRATED NATIONAL HEALTH DATA SYSTEM
The pandemic response has seen the proliferation of 
COVID-19 dashboards to collate and visualise data. The 
public availability of these dashboards has provided trans-
parency and leveraging of expertise outside government 
to inform health decision- making. These lessons are also 
applicable to other health conditions and functions of 
the health system.
Health data collection and management in the country 
currently, like in many LMICs, is grossly inadequate and 
largely unreliable. National health data are fragmented, 
often not validated and can often vary substantially in 
quality across different regions of the country.24 Apart 
from significantly hampering research, the lack of a 
robust health data system forces arbitrary and intuitive 
decision- making. One of the major trade- offs in this 
kind of decision making is equity; those individuals and 
populations for which data is either poor or unavailable, 
thus contributing to an ‘invisibilisation’ of the problem 
by the system.25 Health services utilisation reported by a 
multispecialty private hospital in a large urban centre, 
for example, is likely to be very different from the health 
needs of a low- income rural population or a health facility 
with relatively low levels of educated or insured patients.
Among the structural reasons is the differences in 
the systems of data management, followed by various 
stakeholders. Even within the government system, 
Table 1 Examples of values, institutional linking mechanisms and operational processes for each of the proposed reforms for 
the Indian health system
Values Institutional links Operations
Private sector 
engagement
Access, efficiency, fairness, 
accountability
PMJAY, Clinical 
Establishments’ Act, National 
Health Information System, 
NPPA
Enrolment, delineating benefit 
packages, fraud detection, claims 
management, quality control etc.




National Digital Health 
Mission, Draft Personal Data 
Protection Bill






effectiveness, mutual respect 
and/ or trust
Integrated Public Health 
Department
Interdepartmental, coordination, 
personnel training, priority setting, 
outreach.
NPPA, National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority; PMJAY, Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana.
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different pieces of data may be held by different offices 
with limited resolution and disaggregation possibili-
ties, providing only a partial picture, making it virtually 
useless for policy- making or research. Much of this data 
is also not transparent and difficult to access, despite data 
accessibility initiatives in place.26 These underlying prob-
lems were illustrated even for COVID-19,27 despite close 
monitoring in real- time by decision- makers, experts and 
the lay public. While many of these appear to be tech-
nical problems, underlying their pervasiveness within the 
system is an apathy and a lack of a data culture pertaining 
to public services.
There is, thus, an urgent need for a unified public 
health data system across all schemes/programmes, from 
all states and private healthcare facilities. The National 
Digital Health mission (NDHM), announced by the Prime 
Minister is a step in this direction.28 It envisages a unique 
health ID for every citizen that can help track service 
usage across an individual’s lifetime and allow interoper-
ability across various producers and users of healthcare 
data. While the current NDHM seems to largely target 
population health record, a unified national health data 
system should ideally have a much larger mandate.
Health machineries should move to incorporate the 
shift in thinking on health from a purely biomedical 
function to a complex outcome resulting from an inter-
play of physiological, environmental and sociological 
factors. Thus, the kinds of data being collected should be 
expanded to include socioeconomic parameters and envi-
ronmental factors that we now know are determinants of 
health. In the section below, we suggest a new intersec-
toral institutional architecture to facilitate this kind of 
data collection and management. Rather than envisaging 
health data as a digital ecosystem for actors within the 
healthcare industry such as insurance providers, hospi-
tals and pharmacies, the data system ought to facilitate 
better local decision making and improve equitable 
access to health.
The central government can anchor such an effort by 
pushing for standardisation of processes. The data protec-
tion laws on privacy, confidentiality, access and localisa-
tion of health data that have been in draft stages need to 
be legislated and implemented on a priority basis.24 State 
governments will have to identify state- level priorities as 
well as establish norms around processes of data collec-
tion and usage. Healthcare workers will require ongoing 
training in data management. Additional rigorous quality 
control measures at various levels of information- flow 
may be incorporated. Understanding and expertise at 
local levels of how, why and when e- health services are 
accessed in their respective contexts needs to be incor-
porated in the design of the health information system.
INTERSECTORAL PREVENTIVE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM
As has often been said, COVID-19 was not just a public 
health crisis, but also a humanitarian crisis. It demon-
strated the impact of health on our livelihood, nutrition, 
economy and the environment, underscoring the inter-
sectoral nature of the issue. The response in turn has 
aimed for sectoral convergence, proactive cooperation 
by the private sector and civil society as well as large- scale 
community mobilisation for preventive health. These 
lessons are also applicable to other issues such as air 
pollution, malnutrition and climate change.
Health services on the ground are in fact part of an 
intersectoral matrix of social services that mutually rein-
force each other to meet the felt needs of the citizen. 
Frontline health workers are routinely called on to coor-
dinate with self- help groups, political functionaries and 
others that are outside the purview of the health depart-
ment. District health authorities similarly carry out plan-
ning processes in coordination with the district magistrate 
whose mandate is multisectoral and spanning beyond 
health. The systemic processes for coordinating these 
intersectoral functions however are not institutionalised.
Past zoonotic disease outbreaks such as Nipah virus 
outbreak and the Kyasanur Forest Disease outbreak have 
also highlighted the dire need for integrative approaches 
on ground such as OneHealth and intersectoral action 
for health.29 Dealing with India’s current health chal-
lenges as well as long- term health system preparedness 
and resilience can only be achieved through prioritisa-
tion of intersectoral outcomes and processes at national, 
regional, state, district and subdistrict levels.
The current institutional system consisting of techno-
crats managing vertical disease control programmes is 
not well suited to the kind of intersectoral convergence 
necessary for long- term preparedness. Initiatives such 
as the nutrition programmes involving convergence 
between departments of women and child development 
and health have found some success but challenges of 
communication, data sharing, inadequate resource allo-
cation, trust and accountability persist.30 31
Therefore, the first step would be to achieve an architec-
tural change in how a ministry of public health ought to 
function (as opposed to how the current ministry of health 
and family welfare is conceived). The central government 
should support augmentation of existing health minis-
tries with an integrated public health department with 
exclusive focus on disease prevention and health promo-
tion. The functions of the new integrated public health 
department would be (1) conducting routine, large- scale 
public health surveillance, (2) systematic data analysis 
and impact assessments for decision support and (3) 
intradepartmental and interdepartmental coordination 
across the government. This integrated public health 
department would have to actively recruit field epidemi-
ologists, entomologists, animal health experts, microbi-
ologists, ecologists, sanitation engineers and others to 
ensure a multidisciplinary approach to preparedness 
because we cannot predict what the nature of the next 
public health crisis will be.
The existing integrated disease surveillance project 
allows for outbreak reporting from the ground- up but 
has been limited due to poor human resource capacity, 
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infrastructure limitations and has not been meaning-
fully used.32 33 Preparedness and response to crises like 
COVID-19 or indeed climate change will also require 
real- time analysis of data as well as translation into rele-
vant policy input. This is where a multidisciplinary team 
within the public health department can help to analyse 
the data into meaningful policy support at local levels. 
These analyses could contribute to decentralised deci-
sion making on district health infrastructure planning, 
human resource training, intersectoral coordination.
RECONCILING VALUE UNDERLYING POLICY-MAKING
Instead of a hierarchical government structure flowing 
from central to local levels, we envision a series of inter-
locking institutions at each of these levels of govern-
ment. This implies a commonality of normative values 
underlying policy- making at all levels. A national health 
information system that conflicts with policy goals of 
state governments or fails to take into account cultural 
imperatives of local government will find limited utility 
even if it vastly improves efficiency or effectiveness for 
some functions. Similarly, local health authorities cannot 
deliver integrated social services without explicit buy- in 
and ownership of intersectoral processes at higher levels 
of government. These reforms need to share not just 
operational linkages but also feedback around values and 
principles. In other words, health system reforms require 
ongoing negotiation around both the ‘means’ and the 
‘ends’ of policy- making.
The COVID-19 crisis should enable a coalescing 
around broad ideals of equity and resilience across the 
health system. We recognise, however, that these broad 
philosophical imperatives may translate into differing 
principles and practical judgements about what needs 
to be done (table 1). This is particularly true given the 
diversity of stakeholder interests both within and outside 
government who influence policy- making at all levels. 
A complex health system such as India’s has inherent 
tensions that need to be proactively embraced for 
sustainable reform. An adaptive governance framework 
accommodates differences in principles and judgements 
between actors within and across levels of government, 
through a continuous process of negotiation and reflec-
tiveness. Operational processes on the ground as well as 
cross- cutting institutional structures provide the chan-
nels for this negotiation.
CONCLUSION
The pandemic response necessitated increased oper-
ational decentralisation around testing, containment, 
treatment, as well as other non- health- related social 
and economic decision making.34 This trend needs 
to be reinforced with greater autonomy, consultation, 
cooperation and coordination among different level 
actors. Instead national reform initiatives so far seem to 
have perversely moved away from principles of cooper-
ative federalism.35 Transformative reform can only be 
sustainable through active collaboration across all levels 
of government. Centralised governance cannot account 
for the complexity of a health system as large as India and 
rarely provides effective solutions for highly contextual-
ised situations as illustrated by the COVID-19 crisis. Adap-
tive governance delivered through a multidimensional, 
integrated health system and agenda setting starting at 
the lowest level possible is the way to overcome this and 
future crises.
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